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TAXATION - INCOME TAX - CREDITS - ORPHANS MAINTAINED IN
ORPHANAGE ARE NOT DEPEND.ENTS OF THE TAJ>.'PAYER. UNDER. THE
REVENUE Ac:r OF I932 - The petitioner for a number of years had been
paying the annual deficit of the St. Francis Industrial School for Orphans. In
1933 she entered into and performed a contract with the orphanage whereby
she agreed to pay the maintenance expense of si,..1:y-four named orphans. Petitioner claimed she was entitled to a $400 credit on her income tax return for
each of these orphans. Under the Revenue Act of I932 1 the credit was allowed for each person dependent upon and receiving his chief support from the
taxpayer. Petitioner appealed the decision of the United States Board of Tax
Appeals, which denied the. credit. Held, the board of tax appeals' determination
should be affirmed; while the arrangement superficially complied with the
statute yet the orphans should not be deemed dependents. The beneficiary must
be dependent on the tro.'Payer in a material degree for support, and the obligation on the part of the taxpayer to furnish it must rest on some moral or legal
AN

1 47 Stat. L. 184, § 25: ''There shall be allowed for the purposes of the normal
but not for the surtaX, the following credits against the net income • • •
(d) Credit for Dependents-$400 for each person (other than husband or wife)
dependent upon and receiving his chief support from the taxpayer if such dependent
peISon is under eighteen years of age or is incapable of self-support because mentally
or physically defective." Since the_ I934 act, 48 Stat. -L. 692, the credit has been
allowed for both the normal tax and the surtax. The I938 statute does not change
the amonnt of the credit or the conditions under ,vhich it may be taken. See Revenue
Act of 1938, § zs (b) (z).
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or equitable grounds and not on pure voluntary or charitable impulse. Morrell
v. Commissioner, (C. C. A. 3d, 1939) 107 F. (2d) 34•
Contributions by the taxpayer can be roughly divided into three classes:
(I) the situation wherein there is a gift to an organized charity; ( 2) the case
where the tro..-payer contributes to the support of his dependents; (3) the situation wherein the tro..-payer impelled by a charitable motive doles money to an
individual, i.e., giving money to a beggar on the street. The government allows
a deduction in situation number ( 1) 2 because it seeks to reward a form of
benevolence encouraged by governmental policy. The credit is allowed in the
second case because of public policy and the idea that our system of income
taxation is based on the tro..-payer's ability to pay, i.e., a man with five dependents
is less able to pay than the same man with two dependents. The third class.has
not been recognized under the statute for the reason that it would be impossible to check on the amount so given and to allow a credit in such a case
would result in a great deal of tax evasion. Congress recognized two distinct
schemes of deduction for contribution when it drafted one provision in the
statute as to charitable contributions and a separate provision as to credits for
support of dependents; and though the boundary between the two becomes
rather tenuous yet a line must be drawn since the amount deducted for a
charitable gift differs from the credit allowed for dependents.3 It would seem
that the court's definition of dependent 4 is the best under the circumstances and is
one that will keep the two classes apart so as to prevent tax evasion. It appears to
the writer that there was another factor involved which the court did not mention
in its opinion. There is no doubt that the contract was carefully drawn with
the intent to bring it within the section of the statute allowing credit £or
dependents. Secondly, the charitable deductions are limited to fifteen per cent
of the taxpayer's net income and the petitioner because of other charitable contributions had passed that point. Thus it seems that we have a device employed for
2 47 Stat. L. 181 (1932.), § 2,3 (n), provides that in computing net income there
shall be allowable as a deduction contributions made within the taxable year to organized charitable institutions to an amount which does not exceed l 5 per cent of the
taxpayer's income as computed without the benefit of the deduction. This is unchanged
by the Revenue Act of 1938, § 2.3 (o). As to what is classified as an organized charity,
see Havemeyer v. Commissioner, (C. C. A. zd, 1938) 98 F. (2d) 706; Gimbel
v. Commissioner, (C. C. A. 3d, 1931) 54 F. (2d) 780.
3 The credit allowed for contributions to dependents is $400 per beneficiary, while
the greatest deduction allowed for charitable contributions must not exceed 15 per cent
of the taxpayer's income.
" The definition of dependent which was used by the court is the definition
commonly used by the courts to determine whether or not a beneficiary under a fraternal insurance policy comes within the state statute requiring that a dependent be
named. See McCarthy v. Supreme Lodge, 153 Mass. 314, 26 N. E. 866 (1891); Fuller
v. Supreme Council of the Royal Arcanum, 64 Ind. App. 49, II5 N. E. 372 (1916);
Royal Neighbors of America v. Fletcher, {Tex. Civ. App. 1921) z30 S. W. 476;
Bush v. Modem Woodmen of America, 182 Iowa 515, 152 N. W. 31, 162 N. W.
59 (1915). In Croker v. Helvering, (App. D. C. 1937) 91 F. (2d) 299, the court
used this definition of the principal case in finding the niece of the taxpayer his
dependent and allowed the credit.
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the deliberate purpose of minimizing income tax payments. The courts do
recognize the legal right of a taxpayer to decrease the amount of what otherwise would be his tax or altogether avoid taxation by means which the law
permits.6 The trend of the recent Supreme Court decisions, however, is to
look through devices manufactured to evade federal taxes.6 Thus in Gregory v.
Helverl,ng,7 the Supreme Court held that a reorganization proceeding used
solely to gain the statutory exemptio~ for ta.-..: gains arising out of a transfer of
assets by one corporation to another did not bring the tro..-payer within the exemption although superficially the statute was complied with as was true in the
principal case. The Supreme Court sounded a warning to all those who intend
to evade tax payment through sham transactions in Higgins v. Smith,8 where
the Court denied a deduction to a taxpayer for the loss resulting from a sale
of his securities to his own corporation. Perhaps even more striking is the recent
decision in Helvenng v. Clifford,9 holding income of a short-term irrevocable
trust to be taxable to the settler. Thus the decision in the principal case, in so
far as it looks to the substance of the transaction, is in accord with this trend
in Supreme Court decisions.10
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6 "C!nited States v. Isham, I7 Wall. (84 U. S.) 496 (I873); Superior Oil Co.
v. Mississippi, 280 U.S. 390, 50 S. Ct. I69 (I929). This sentiment is echoed by the
English court. In Ayrshire Pullman Motor Services v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue,
I4 Tax Cases 754 (1929), the Lord President of the Scottish Court of Sessions said:
"No man in this country is under the smallest obligation, moral or other, so to arrange
his legal relations to his business or to his property as to enable the Inland Revenue to
put the largest possible shovel into his stores. The Inland Revenue is not slow-and
quite rightly-to take every advantage which is open to it under the taxing statutes for
the purpose of depleting the ta.\.'Payer's pocket, and the taxpayer is, in like manner,
entitled to be astute to prevent, so far as he honestly can, the depletion of his means
by the Inland Revenue." Quoted in 184 LAw T1111ES 347 (1937).
6 See Griffiths v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 355, 60 S. Ct. 277 (1939).
7 293 U. S. 465, 55 S. Ct. 266 (1934).
8 (U.S. 1940) 60 S. Ct. 355.
0 (U.S. 1940) 60 S. Ct. 55410The Supreme Court in Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 561, 60 S. Ct. 355 at 358
( 1940), said: "The Government may look at actualities and upon determination that the
form employed for doing business or carrying out the challenged tax event is unreal or a
sham, may sustain or disregard the effect of the fiction as best serves the purpose of
the tax statute. To hold otherwise would pocmit the schemes of taxpayers to supersede
legislation in the determination of the time and manner of ta.'{ation."

